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1. Scientism: Sin or Salvation? 
 
Scientism is usually thought of as sinful but it can be redeemed for our salvation. All that 
is required to arrive at a worthy form of scientism is application of the heavenly virtues of 
charity, humility and temperance. Scientism should not be dogmatic or uncritical, nor 
should it ignore the actual limitations of current scientific knowledge. There are other 
modes of inquiry that deserve epistemic respect, and scientists should not be deferred to 
about matters beyond their expertise.2 However, limits should not be placed on what 
science can study and we cannot say in advance what the limits of future science will be. 
Where it conflicts with common sense, religion and tradition, science should be regarded 
as authoritative for the purposes of education and public policy as well as objective 
inquiry; and scientific knowledge is even relevant to moral and political deliberation.3 
This is the core of scientism.4 Section 3 of this paper elaborates a way of thinking of 
scientism as a stance (in the sense of Bas van Fraassen explained in the next section) 
characterised in terms of positive and negative components. Section 4 characterises and 
defends an humane form of scientism worthy of further development. 
 
The term ‘scientism’ is standardly used pejoratively to refer to: 
 
(a) The misapplication of scientific methods outside of appropriate domains;5 
                                                 
1 Thanks to the organisers and the other contributors to the Amsterdam conference, from whom I learned a 
lot about scientism. Special thanks are due to Alex Rosenberg, Susan Haack, and Don Ross. I am extremely 
grateful to Jeroen de Ridder, Rik Peels, Damian Veal and René van Woudenberg for detailed comments on 
a draft. 
2 As discussed further in Section 4, to say that an activity deserves epistemic respect means among other 
things that it makes a contribution to knowledge. 
3 ‘Science’ should be taken to mean well-established science, not the latest hypotheses. Of course, there are 
borderline cases and they should be taken on a case by case basis. 
4 There are many forms of scientism and many ways of categorizing them, as explained by Rik Peels in his 
chapter in this volume. The core of scientism is epistemological and methodological. The humane scientism 
defended here does not match exactly any of the varieties identified in the literature, but it is has something 
in common with many if not all of them. 
5 Susan Haack (2003) makes this number (5) among six features she associates with scientism (the last of 
which is (c) below, and more of which are discussed in Section 3). It is the most important since, 
fundamentally, the debate about scientism is about whether or not we should set limits to scientific inquiry, 
or so this paper argues. Haack is right that the way the term ‘scientism’ is standardly used makes it 
definitively a bad thing. However, here it is argued that it can be reclaimed and used positively because it 
 
 
(b) excessive faith in science’s ability to replace existing forms of inquiry; 
(c) disdain for the contribution of the arts and humanities to our knowledge and self-
understanding; and, 
(d) extreme forms of scientific realism and reductionism about current science, and 
internalism about the history of science.6 
 
Scientism is usually portrayed as a kind of scientific imperialism that urges scientists to 
conquer new domains. For example, neuroscience, cognitive science and Darwinism 
being used in literary criticism might be so regarded. However, the metaphor of conquest 
is not apt because the scientific study of a new domain need not involve conflict with 
existing forms of inquiry, even if some enthusiasts (often popularisers in evolutionary 
psychology or neuroscience) overreach by claiming so. The term ‘scientism’ was 
introduced to criticise those who advocated that human beings and society could be 
studied with scientific methods. It was largely (a) that was at issue then as now. The 
charge of scientism was first brought against those who had the temerity to argue that 
there is something to be learned from what we now call the behavioural sciences. 7 
Despite the tradition of philosophers of social science arguing against naturalism, the 
view that there is no knowledge at all to be had in economics, scientific psychology, and 
so on, is implausible in the extreme, and current critics of scientism do not defend it. 
Instead, the boundary of what cannot be studied scientifically is standardly placed at 
consciousness or experience. Scientism that denies limits to science need not support (b)–
(d). 
 
To reclaim scientism as a badge of honour, and to advocate the unlimited application 
and/or further development of scientific methods, does not require regarding scientific 
knowledge of human beings as replacing all the other ways people study their humanity 
and culture. The scientistic cause need not devalue and threaten the arts and humanities as 
in (b) and (c). Indeed, far from replacing them science has of course given the arts and 
humanities much more to study; since, for example, one can now study literary form in 
scientific writing. Moreover, the arts and humanities have to some extent abandoned 
traditional presuppositions about human beings and the world, for example, essentialist 
ideas about gender and race, and geocentric ideas about cosmology that science has 
refuted. To a significant extent we now have an arts and humanities that reflects and is 
indebted to our scientific knowledge of the world. However, these developments do not 
undermine the fundamental goals of humanistic study, and indeed any sensible humanist 
does not want to be in the grip of falsehoods. The appreciation of facts is not exclusively 
a trait of scientists. The arts and humanities have evolved with the advancement of 
science, and rightly so. It would be absurd for literary critics, historians or philosophers to 
                                                                                                                                                 
was originally deployed to criticise a scientific expansion that proved successful. 
6 In debates about the historiography of science, `internalism’ is taken to refer to the idea that scientific 
theory change can be explained with reference to arguments, evidence and experimental results, and 
without reference to economic, political, psychological, and social factors. 
7 Some, such as Hayek (1979), use the term ‘scientism’ to criticize particular forms of putative social 
science that they regard as pseudoscientific. Misapplication of scientific methods is always bad science, and 




continue to think in the terms of the kinds of theories we had about ourselves before we 
acquired our scientific understanding of our bodies, our brains, and our evolution. 
 
Insofar as charge (a) presupposes that there are a priori limits on what can be 
scientifically studied, it begs the question against scientism. There may be good 
arguments for limits to science, but putative examples have been repeatedly refuted by 
the progress of science so far, and the prospects for further extensions of science into new 
domains are good. For example, the study of the brain and consciousness is at an early 
stage, and big data and supercomputing is opening up new possibilities. However, how  
successful they will ultimately be remains to be seen, and in both domains there is a good 
deal of pseudoscience or at least overreach. The defender of scientism does not say in 
advance how and where the application of scientific methods will be successful, or what 
kind and extent of knowledge is possible. Often the questions science ends up answering 
are not the ones with which we began, since the scientific study of the world teaches us 
how to think about it better. Science also teaches us how to do better science. These 
arguments are made in more detail in Section 3. 
 
As for (b), clearly, scientific hubris is as bad as any other kind.8 Scientism must guard 
against an uncritical attitude to science. It must frankly acknowledge how much remains 
speculative or unknown, and avoid complacency about the extent to which current 
science is free from economic, ideological and political influence. However, such self-
critical vigilance is no ad hoc modification of scientism. Rather, it is compatible with the 
scientistic spirit given voice in this paper, which is arguably just the spirit of science itself 
(about which more is said in Section 3). 
 
In relation to (d), there is a scientistic view that all scientific theory change is rational and 
independent of cultural, historical, psychological, social, and political factors, and that 
our best scientific theories are entirely and literally true. However, arguably that is 
undermined by the scientific study of science. Any defender of scientism who reflects 
with a scientific attitude on the history and philosophy of science can reasonably be 
expected to have an appropriately circumspect view of science, in contradiction of (d), 
and again in keeping with the scientistic spirit. Similarly, strong forms of reductionism 
are arguably not scientifically defensible and need play no part in scientism (see 
Ladyman and Ross 2007 chapters 1 and 2 for a discussion of reductionism and scientific 
realism and antirealism). The issue of whether scientism must involve some form of 
materialism or physicalism is taken up in Section 3. 
 
Scientism can be seen as a struggle for science’s self-determination in seeking to liberate 
territory from the forces of superstition and the supernatural, and denying non-scientists 
the power to stipulate what can and cannot be studied scientifically. Disdain for the arts 
and humanities (c) is not a core component of scientism, but it does regard beliefs about 
human nature and the world based on common sense, intuition, religion, and other forms 
of tradition, as having no privileged claim to truth over rival beliefs based on differing 
                                                 
8 Haack (2003) defines scientism as “a too uncritically deferential attitude toward science”. 
 
 
intuitions or traditions, and no immunity to revision in the light of scientific knowledge.9 
It also denies that there are any domains of inquiry that are in principle off limits for 
science, while accepting that actual science and scientists are imperfect and limited. (The 
relationship between science and value is discussed in Section 4). 
 
In philosophy scientism is similarly a struggle for liberation, but this time from common 
sense, intuition and tradition. Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue for a rebellion against the 
dominant concepts and methods of analytic metaphysics and their replacement by 
naturalised metaphysics. They articulate and defend a form of scientism in metaphysics 
that synthesises empiricism and materialism as characterized by van Fraassen, adopting 
his notion of a philosophical ‘stance’, as briefly explained in the next section. They say 
little about scientism outside of philosophy, and are much more circumspect than those 
advocating strong generic forms of scientism such as Alex Rosenberg (2011). Notably, 
unlike the latter they do not advocate physicalism.10 Brown and Ladyman (2009) argue 
for a weak form of physicalism, and argue that, like empiricism and materialism, it has 
positive and negative components. In what follows I build on all the above work to 
defend ‘the scientistic stance’. I argue that scientism, like empiricism and materialism, is 
so fundamental to the philosophical views of its adherents that it is arguably best 
considered as a stance or orientation rather than as a particular doctrine. So construed, 
various positive and negative components characterise stronger and weaker forms of 
scientism. I argue that the scientistic spirit should be identified with the intellectual 
qualities that many scientists and philosophers of science have valued most in science, 
and so ought to be similarly valued. It is compatible with a humane form of scientism that 
avoids the excesses of (b)–(d) above. 
 
 
2. Van Fraassen on Stances11 
 
The motivation for the idea that some venerable philosophical positions should be recast 
as stances is the implausibility of the alternative: namely, understanding them as 
doctrines. Van Fraassen characterises the latter view as implicitly adopting what he calls 
‘Principle Zero’: for any philosophical position X, there is a statement X+, such that to 
adopt X is to believe X+ (2002, p. 41). While it is interesting and important to explore the 
various different doctrines associated with philosophical positions such as empiricism 
and materialism, to reduce them to such doctrines does not do justice to the depth and 
breadth of their influence, nor to what it is to be an empiricist or a materialist. To have 
such a stance is to engage in certain forms of life and not others, to have various attitudes, 
                                                 
9  Common sense beliefs are of course often true and confirmed by more systematic study. Likewise 
traditional belief systems embody much knowledge. That is not the issue here. Rather the point is that if 
scientific study determines that a folk remedy is inefficacious the fact that its use is entrenched in a culture 
cuts no epistemic ice. 
10 This paper is compatible with everything that Ladyman and Ross 2007 says but it says things about 
scientism more broadly with which Don Ross may not agree, or that he may think are too weak. Note that 
everything that follows is compatible with denying the very strong form of scientism that Rosenberg 
defends which tends towards including (c). Ladyman (2011) develops the scientific stance in relation to 
metaphysics. 
11 What follows is a brief exposition of ideas in The Empirical Stance (Van Fraassen 2008). 
 
 
commitments and values, and to adhere to certain norms. The concept of a stance is a 
much richer one than the concept of a belief or doctrine. The appraisal of beliefs takes 
place from the point of view of a stance, and the methods and background beliefs 
associated with different stances may differ. Van Fraassen’s epistemology is voluntarist 
in the sense that there is no ultimate source of epistemic authority, and we have a choice 
about upon what to rely. Stances do not admit of neutral adjudication or justification. 
However, a stance may lead to one’s life going more or less well by one’s own lights and 
one may adhere to a stance, or abandon it and adopt another one accordingly. 
 
In the case of empiricism, X+ is the claim that all knowledge comes from experience, 
with the corollary that there is no a priori knowledge. Van Fraassen points out, however, 
that it is implausible to claim that we know by experience that all knowledge comes from 
experience. On the other hand, the claim that there is a priori knowledge seems to be 
ruled out of empirical confirmation a priori by empiricists. These principles of 
empiricism cannot be treated as falling within their own scope on pain of inconsistency. 
The attempt to grapple with these problems under the grip of Principle Zero leads to the 
dichotomy between ‘naturalised’ and ‘transcendent’ empiricism, where the former takes 
empiricism to be empirically justified, and the latter takes it to be somehow uniquely 
lacking the need for empirical justification. Van Fraassen takes it that neither of these two 
positions is acceptable and so concludes that Principle Zero is false, and that empiricism 
is best understood as a ‘stance’. He goes on to present materialism as a stance too. 
 
Stances have positive and negative doxastic and methodological components. In the case 
of empiricism, the positive components are to take one’s knowledge from experience, and 
to regard any proposition as in principle subject to empirical consideration. The negative 
components of empiricism are the view that there is no substantive a priori knowledge, 
and that rationalist methods do not deliver knowledge of concrete reality.12 Explanation 
should not be by posit. Indeed the demand for explanation must at some point be rejected 
and many empiricists disdain explanation in terms of unobservable entities, properties 
and processes. 
 
As characterized by van Fraassen, materialism has much in common with scientism 
insofar as among its positive commitments are that we should defer to science about what 
exists, and that science is complete in the sense that there is nothing real that it does not 
describe. The materialist also thinks science tells us that everything that exists is material. 
Among its negative components are the attitude that there is nothing supernatural, and the 
value that science should not posit sui generis intentional, mental or spiritual entities or 
properties to explain human behaviour, and intentional, mental or spiritual phenomena 
such as they are. 
 
The problems with empiricism include the role that a priori thought plays in science, how 
                                                 
12 The restriction to ‘substantive’ knowledge is intended to allow the empiricist to concede that there is 
analytic a priori knowledge of a sort, for example, knowledge that a vixen is a female fox had by someone 
who has no experience of foxes. Empiricists of course have the problem that rationalist methods seem to 




to deal with the problem of induction and confirmation of theory by evidence, and the 
importance in science of the search for explanations of phenomena in addition to 
regularities that subsume them, and the success of positing unobservables such as fields 
and particles. The problems with materialism are that we need to know what exactly 
science is for us to be able to defer to it, that current science is nowhere near complete, 
and finally and fatally, that science tells us that not everything is material, indeed 
arguably it tells us that nothing is.13 In both cases, and in the case of physicalism (about 
which more below), the positive components are harder to defend than the negative ones. 
For example, the view that all knowledge comes from experience is harder to defend than 
scepticism about the pretensions of those who claim a priori knowledge of reality, and 
scepticism about the pretensions of those who claim to know of the existence of 
immaterial things retains its appeal even if matter is not what it was thought to be. 
Arguably, materialism can be revised to physicalism in a way that retains its core 
negative commitments (Brown and Ladyman 2009). In the next section it is argued that 
scientism is best thought of as a stance, and that as such it synthesises elements of 
empiricism, materialism and physicalism. 
 
 
3 The Scientistic Spirit 
 
If there were a Principle Zero for scientism it would be a doctrine such as that all 
knowledge comes from science. So understood it would face the same dilemma as 
empiricism in answering the question as to how we know scientism is correct. 
Furthermore, the idea that all knowledge comes from science is not plausible because we 
have plenty of other sources of knowledge including memory, perception and testimony. 
All of these are fallible, of course, but so is science. Both the idea that science tells us that 
all knowledge comes from science, and the idea that the latter claim is uniquely self-
justifying can make scientism so characterised seem idiotic and dogmatic, but neither is 
part of what we should take the position to be. It is more appropriate to think of scientism 
as a stance because it too is richer than doctrines like the above and it involves norms, 
values, commitments and forms of life.14 It is helpful in this regard to distinguish between 
the positive and negative components of scientism, by analogy with the positive and 
negative components of the other aforementioned stances. 
 
The core positive commitment of scientism is that there are no domains of inquiry that 
are in principle off-limits for science. Everything real can in principle be investigated by 
scientific methods and no limits should be placed on what science can study.15 It follows 
                                                 
13 Science tells us not everything is material because the ontologies of the special sciences include such 
things as mating strategies and markets. Physics tells us that ordinary matter is mostly empty space and that 
subatomic particles are very different from motes of dust. See Ladyman and Ross (2007). 
14 A lot more could be said about all of these in relation to all the stances mentioned in this paper, 
especially about the associated forms of life. The commitments, norms and values of the scientific stance 
are like everything in science, subject to self-critical scrutiny and revision and this makes it very different 
from other stances. 
15 Of course making this precise requires a specification of what science and scientific methods are, about 
which more below. As a first approximation, take them to be given by ostension of the actual scientific 
community (as Ladyman and Ross do in formulating their `Principle of Naturalistic Closure’, which is 
 
 
that we should not believe in what is claimed to exist but posited to be inaccessible to 
science in principle. What can be studied by science is what we take to be the natural 
world. In particular, we ourselves and our cultures and societies are part of nature. This 
all clearly has much in common with aspects of materialism as characterised by van 
Fraassen (and very much echoes Wilfrid Sellars). In common with empiricism, scientism 
holds that science based on experience is the best way to acquire knowledge about the 
world. Scientific culture and its methods are supremely reliable and self-correcting.16 It is 
important to add the commitment that science be regarded as authoritative for the 
purposes of education and public policy. Scientific knowledge is even relevant to moral 
and political deliberation, as argued in the next section. A further positive commitment is 
to science replacing all other forms of inquiry. As discussed in the introduction, the latter 
is not necessary for scientism. In the next section it is argued that it should not be 
adopted. 
 
The core negative commitment is that, as said above, beliefs about human nature and the 
world based on common sense, intuition, and religion and other forms of tradition have 
no claim to the truth over rival beliefs based on differing intuitions or traditions, and no 
immunity to revision in the light of scientific knowledge. This can be thought of as 
subsuming empiricism’s rejection of a priori knowledge, and materialism’s repudiation of 
the supernatural. According to scientism, common sense, intuition, and religious and 
other traditions have no epistemic authority over science. There is no systematic 
institutional source of knowledge of the objective nature of the world that trumps 
science.17 A further negative component is disdain for the arts and humanities, and all 
other forms of humanistic inquiry. Again, as discussed in the introduction, this is not 
necessary for scientism. In the next section it is argued that it should be repudiated as not 
in keeping with the scientistic spirit. 
 
Scientism is popularly associated with many other ideas. As noted in the introduction in 
(d), these include unrealistic ideas about how science itself works, as well as strong forms 
of materialism and reductionism (about which more below). Scientism is also associated 
with various forms of ethical and political views, some of which are discussed in the last 
section. However, none of these are part of the core idea of scientism, and many of them 
conflict with its spirit, as argued below. 
 
As with empiricism and materialism, the positive components are harder to defend than 
the negative ones. For example, the claim that science tells us about the fundamental 
nature of space and time is much less defensible than the claim that we cannot learn about 
them by any other means. Similarly, the claim that science tells us about everything is 
                                                                                                                                                 
critiqued in the René de Woudenberg’s contribution to this volume). Note that scientism can also study 
itself from its own point of view. 
16 There are numerous cases from recent science, such as that of that of the expansion of the universe, 
where the relevant scientific community has corrected its own errors in response to new evidence without 
external pressure being brought to bear. The replication controversy in psychology and the disputes about 
the evidence base in behavioural economics are examples where the process has not yet produced answers 
and may show some orthodox science to be badly flawed in some respects, which often is the case. 
17 Journalism and the law, and disciplines such as archaeology and history, in so far as they establish facts 
about objective reality, rely on scientific methods and proto-scientific reasoning. 
 
 
less plausible than the repudiation of putative realms of being that are posited by religious 
and other traditions. The best reason to adopt the core scientism characterised above is 
the track record of science compared to other forms of inquiry. Without science we would 
have a tiny fraction of the knowledge that we have, and we would still be in the grip of 
various dogmas about life and the planet depending on our particular cultural 
background. Religions and traditional forms of knowledge agree on little with regard to 
the objective nature of reality, and disagree substantially about the nature of the human 
body, mind and soul (if any). Many religions also have internal doctrinal disputes about 
fundamental metaphysical matters, such as the doctrines of transubstantiation in 
Christianity and reincarnation in Buddhism. Science, by contrast, is a uniquely universal 
form of culture. At the time of writing the largest radio telescope in the world is being 
built in China to test the same theories, by the same kinds of methods, as the largest 
optical telescope in Chile. The powerful particle collider, also being built in China, uses 
the same physics as CERN in Geneva. Science is uniquely successful as a form of 
epistemic inquiry, and the track record of attempts to curtail its scope is poor. In the next 
section more is said in favour of scientism. 
 
It is ironic indeed that some defenders of scientism lend it the air of dogmatism and a lack 
of epistemic humility when science itself is so often characterized by scientists echoing 
Karl Popper, as involving fallibilism and a constantly critical attitude to one’s own beliefs 
(see, for example, Deutsch 2011). Of course, much has been said in response to Popper, 
echoing Thomas Kuhn (1962) about how everyday scientific activity does not involve the 
scientists involved questioning their fundamental theories at all. Indeed, science is now so 
vast and specialized that the average scientist must accept and learn how to use a huge 
amount of theory that they may only dimly understand. However, Popper’s point can be 
taken to apply to the scientific community as a whole, in which case one does indeed find 
that even the most cherished assumptions are forever under scrutiny and subject to 
refinement and further testing. For example, the equivalence of gravitational and inertial 
mass has been known since the seventeenth century and tested repeatedly ever since, but 
physicists still devise new ways of verifying it to ever-greater precision. However, there 
is a division of labour in such respects, and the vast majority of physicists never question 
the equivalence principle in their daily work. 
 
Fallibilism is integral to the scientistic spirit, and it is entirely in accord with it to say that 
science is the worst source of knowledge about the world apart from all the rest. The 
history of science teaches us that even cherished laws may be subject to revision. For 
example, the `fundamental dogma’ of molecular biology, according to which information 
can pass from the genotype to the phenotype but never vice versa is not entirely correct. 
The denial of Lamarkian inheritance (or ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’) that the 
fundamental dogma expresses was central to the synthesis of evolutionary biology with 
molecular genetics, but the revised understanding we now have through epigenetics was 
not developed by creationists or intelligent design theorists but by biologists themselves. 
Similarly, it was physicists striving for scope and accuracy, and being prepared to 
challenge their own principles, who brought about revolutions in physics that led to 




Three objections to the above are as follows: 
 
(1) scientism is empty without a definition of science; 
 
(2) science cannot tell us about right and wrong, but moral norms and values are part of 
reality, so scientism is refuted; and, 
 
(3) science cannot tell us about the first person perspective, but the latter is real, so 
scientism is refuted. 
 
(1) raises an analogue of Hempel’s dilemma for physicalism for the positive doxastic 
components of scientism. The problem is that in assertions such as ‘scientific methods 
can be extended to any domain’, the scope of quantification can be read two ways. Either, 
for any domain, there is a scientific method for studying it; or, there is a scientific method 
such that any domain falls within its scope. The first reading is obviously weaker and 
allows for the fact that the methods of science have developed as science has been 
extended to new domains. These methods, and indeed the domains themselves, are 
integrated to varying extents (as argued below). Nonetheless, it would be rash to bet that 
the current range of scientific methods won’t change as science continues to develop and 
to study new domains, as well as continuing to study itself. Hence, the promise of the 
scientific method for every domain might seem to be either false of current scientific 
methods, or only trivially true, if it is taken to mean that some scientific method can be 
found, and if no constraints are put on what counts as a scientific method. 
 
The nature of the latter is of course highly contested. It is unreasonable to demand that 
the advocate of scientism give a full account of the scientific method but they must have 
something to say about it. Haack regards what she characterises as `preoccupations’ with 
the demarcation of science from nonscience, and with identifying the scientific method 
and regards, as characteristics of scientism. She thereby presupposes that the study and 
articulation of scientific methodology is unnecessary. However, the demarcation of 
science from pseudoscience is, arguably at least, more important than ever, because there 
is a lot of material that adopts the superficial form of good science but violates standards 
of rigour that are required for reliable inferences to be drawn from data. Even the most 
expert scientists must guard against misapplications of statistics, because there are so 
many subtle traps into which to fall. Continual scrutiny of methodology is integral to 
science’s capacity to produce reliable knowledge and to correct its own errors. Given that 
science has such an important role in the law, medicine and public policy, the 
demarcation of science from pseudoscience is vital. While we may not be able to say 
precisely what is and is not scientific, we have learned a great deal about the difference 
between good and bad ways of reasoning inductively. Statistics is a science that barely 
existed before the twentieth century. 
 
Despite the sophistication and variety of techniques current science uses to study the 
world it is unlikely to be apt to understand everything. Science evolves new methods as it 
extends into new domains, so the right way to understand the optimism of scientism is in 
terms of the indefinite extendability of current science rather than its all-encompassing 
 
 
nature. One thing we have learned from the history of science is that science adapts and 
evolves. The social sciences don’t use the same measuring devices as physics. It is 
reasonable to conjecture it will continue to do so. Hence scientism too must continually 
evolve along with science itself. For example, the ideas now used to describe genetics 
and the brain incorporate ideas of function and information that could have had no place 
in the scientism of the past because they had no place in the science of the past. It took 
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection to transform what could count as 
scientific by redeeming teleological reasoning. Scientism must continually evolve as 
science evolves. 
 
However, there is a common core of both scientific theories and methods. The whole of 
natural science is based on the taxonomy of the periodic table of atomic structure, the 
fundamental forces and particles of the Standard Model, and the common system of 
scientific units and fundamental dimensions. These theories and their experimental 
technologies are applied to everything from the early and distant universe to the human 
brain.18 The use of logic and mathematics is common to all the sciences, and all scientists 
recognise the need to consider competing explanations, to look for sources of error in 
their experiments, to make precise measurements and so on. The idea that empirical 
testing is the ultimate source of epistemic authority in science is pretty much universal. 
Extensions of the scientific method must be integrated into the existing edifice, and of 
course old methods are often used to assess the reliability of measurement devices and 
background theories. The integration of methods and theories is essential to the success 
of current science, which is often highly multidisciplinary and hugely collaborative. In 
sum, (1) can be met by characterising science in evolutionary terms as whatever evolves 
from current science. In any case, the arguments that matter in practice are those 
concerning extending current science into new domains in which case the extension of 
the term ‘scientific methods’ is clear (though again it is routine in science for there to be 
new methods and modifications of existing ones). 
 
As for the relationship between scientism and physicalism, it must be noted that the 
successful application of the physics of particles and fields to chemistry and biology has 
made science integrated and unified, and at least provides prima facie grounds for some 
kind of asymmetric supervenience of everything on the physical. Whether or not this 
vindicates strong forms of reductionism it certainly means that there is something to the 
idea that every putatively non-physical thing, such as a mind, somehow depends on the 
physical stuff associated with it. For some, of course, all this is very much understated 
and we have good reason to be more or less eliminative reductionists about everything 
except fundamental physics. Scientism as understood here, however, is definitely not 
committed to such views, nor to materialism. Indeed, far from reducing everything to 
matter in motion, as mentioned above, physics itself has refuted materialism and in its 
place we have at best a more vague kind of physicalism. Nonetheless, atomism did 
triumph in chemistry and led us to the more complex conception of the atomic world that 
                                                 
18  While there is no doubt that these theories are only approximations that will be refined by future 
developments, they, like Newtonian mechanics and ray optics, will continue to have their domain of 
applicability, and should be expected to be explained as a limit in future science, in accordance with the 
`correspondence principle’ (see Ladyman and Ross 2007, chapter 2). 
 
 
we now have. 19  Sui generis chemical and vital forces were not fecund for the 
development of explanatorily and predictively detailed and successful theories, and the 
pursuit of unity by building bridges between disciplines is one of the hallmarks of current 
science. However, even strong reductionists must concede that when it comes to 
epistemology and methodology, simple reductions seem unavailable. The best we can say 
is that science does not advance by positing new kinds of physical entities, properties or 
processes solely to account for biological or psychological phenomena. This is an 
inductive hypothesis that may ultimately turn out to be false, but it is seems to be a 
warranted generalisation of the lessons learned when the programmes of sui generis 
chemical, physiological and vital forces failed (Brown and Ladyman 2009). 
 
In respect of objection (2), it is no part of the core of scientism as understood here to say 
that scientific knowledge includes what is right and wrong, nor to say that science tells us 
there is no right and wrong. However, conceding that moral norms are part of reality does 
not refute the scientism characterised here, since nothing that has been said about the 
latter so far entails denying the former. Those who adopt the scientistic stance may hold 
some form of the fact/value distinction and argue that science is completely silent about 
the moral norms we should adopt, and hence about all or part of ethics and politics. 
However, they may also insist that we should be scientifically informed about the 
biological and social facts that bear on the practicality of ethical and political policy 
proposals. They may also argue that advertised sources of moral knowledge need not 
command our assent. Scientism as characterised above is nonetheless compatible with 
allowing that different sources of beliefs about various matters, and especially ethics, 
may legitimately play an important role in social and public policy. If science conflicts 
with those sources of belief, that can only be because the relevant science establishes 
facts that they deny, and in those circumstances it is hardly appropriate to criticise the 
new scientific knowledge for correcting error. In the next section it is argued that this has 
indeed happened with ethics and the human sciences, and a good thing it is too. In any 
case, adhering to epistemic norms and values is already part of scientism as characterised 
here, since science relies upon them. Accepting moral norms and values is not relevantly 
different, so, while so doing is not part of the core of scientism, it is compatible with it. 
 
(3) is an interesting challenge. It is closely related to the idea of the hard problem of 
consciousness. In reply, note that science has already at least told us some things about 
the first person perspective, by distinguishing different forms of consciousness and 
experience, and revealing the existence of blindsight and other phenomena that shatter a 
priori presuppositions about perception. If we characterise science in terms of what can 
be understood from the third person perspective then it is true by definition that it cannot 
tell us about the first person perspective. However, even if there are ineffable truths about 
the latter this is hardly a threat to scientism, which is intended to take a stand against 
taking anything other than science as a source of knowledge. 
 
The rest of this paper defends a form of scientism that has (i) the core positive and 
negative components discussed above, but not stronger ones; and (ii) the epistemic 
                                                 
19 The price of success was the discovery that atoms are not in fact ‘atomic’ in the original sense of 
indivisible and mechanical. 
 
 
charity, humility and temperance that is in keeping with the spirit of science discussed 
above. The resulting form of scientism is cognisant of the limitations of current scientific 
knowledge, and the ways in which seemingly supremely well-confirmed theories have 
turned out to be wrong in significant respects. Furthermore, a realistic grasp of the depth 
and breadth of current science, and its conceptual and mathematical sophistication, means 
that we should be very sceptical about grand metaphysical claims that are alleged to 
follow from theories, especially if the latter are speculative and have not enjoyed their 
own predictive success. Not everything that comes out of the mouth or pen of a scientist 
is science, and scientists discussing other specialisms, philosophy, and indeed scientism 
may be particularly liable to what Ken Waters calls ‘science overreach’ (2017). Scientism 
demands eternal vigilance and perpetual critique. Scientists should not be deferred to 
about matters beyond their expertise, and there are other modes of inquiry that deserve 





4 Humane Scientism 
 
Scientism began with the extension of science to the study of human beings and societies. 
As Richard Olson says, ‘scientism’ is “the transfer of ideas, practices, attitudes and 
methodologies from the context of the study of the natural world (which was assumed to 
be independent of human needs and expectations) into the study of humans and social 
institutions” (Olson 2008, p.1). Whether the critics of scientism like it or not this has been 
done successfully. In response, they make much of the importance of humanistic values 
as if the pretensions of science to tell us about ourselves were a threat to our humane 
treatment of one another. It is worth reflecting on how our ethics have also evolved along 
with the scientific image of people. Ironically, there is certainly a correlation between the 
development of the naturalistic understanding of human beings, and the development of 
the idea of universal human rights and the abolition of forms of cruel punishments and 
various forms of ill-treatment. This is most clearly seen in the case of atypical human 
psychology. The identification of conditions such as autism, dyslexia and dyspraxia has 
led to a much better understanding of the normal range of human variation, and a much 
better way of treating children as they develop. Ideas of naturalness in cultural and 
religious traditions are the alternative to the scientific understanding and they are 
associated with a punitive attitude to deviation from the norm. The treatment of the 
mentally ill leaves much to be desired, and pharmacology arguably determines taxonomy 
and treatment in a scientifically dubious way. Compared to the ‘madhouses’ of recent 
history, however, we have come a long way. If we care about human wellbeing, we 
should note that what science has taught us about ourselves and society has had a largely 
positive impact on our treatment of people that do not fit the prescientific conceptions of 
how they are meant to be. 
 
The claim that we would be better off without the scientific understanding of human 
behaviour, character and cognition seems completely absurd once it is made explicit. 
However, it is the logical consequence of the rejection of the core scientism argued for 
 
 
above. Critics of scientism should be careful for what they wish, and careful not to take 
for granted the understanding we have of ourselves as natural beings. In the absence of 
science, we know that often what fills the void is prejudice and superstition. This why it 
is important that scientism decrees that beliefs about ourselves based on common sense, 
intuition, religion, and other forms of tradition, have no prima facie claim to the truth 
over those of other traditions, and certainly no immunity to revision in the light of 
scientific knowledge. If science establishes facts that inherited belief systems deny, it is 
hardly appropriate to criticise the new scientific knowledge for correcting error. 
 
In his book on scientism Tom Sorell discusses `philosophy and the infatuation with 
science’ (1991) as if this was something aberrant, but if we think of science as the human 
institution that gives us reliable knowledge of objective reality then it is quite right for 
philosophers to be infatuated with it. The sciences are the progeny of philosophy and 
philosophers are right to be appreciative of them. The problem is rather that too often 
discussions in philosophy presuppose accounts of cognition or physical reality that are 
uninformed by and even incompatible with what science is telling us. Similarly, rather 
than science being culturally dominant and informing decision making too much, 
governments are much more often beholden to other interest groups and scientific 
evidence is ignored. For example, in the UK, bishops sit in the House of Lords but there 
are no ex officio representatives of science, and very few politicians have been scientists. 
 
Scientism might be associated with cold and uncaring approaches to decision making, 
reducing individual people to units of economic output, and neglecting the value of 
public and social goods. However, there is nothing about the core values of scientism that 
encourages these attitudes, and they arguably conflict with it. Science tells us that every 
individual human being is born utterly incompetent and remains unable to fend for itself 
for years as a result of the brain having the flexibility for the child to be taught the 
cognitive content of whatever culture into which it is born.20 Sociality is essential to the 
unique features of our cognition, and collective endeavour is essential to our flourishing. 
Hence, scientific knowledge of our nature does not support individualism, and there is no 
reason to associate clinical impartiality or the determination to be objective with a lack of 
compassion. 
 
Current scientific knowledge is the product of a social history of experiment, theorising 
and application, interacting and refining each other through the constant dialogue of 
people questioning and correcting each other. Of course, scientists too are susceptible to 
confirmation bias; some even cheat and lie, distort and dissemble, and abuse power just 
as people do in other walks of life. More prosaically sometimes people are marginalised 
unfairly or are ignored because they lack status. However, the scientific community 
functions to produce reliable beliefs, albeit imperfectly, because of shared commitments 
to knowledge, understanding and truth that are enacted every day when people exchange 
and explain ideas to each other, and debate with the common goal of reaching a better 
                                                 
20 I am not here taking a stand on the nativism debate, but pointing out that human infants remain wholly 
dependent upon caregivers for a much longer period of time than the young of other species. 
 
 
understanding of the world.21 Any association of science with rampant individualism and 
selfishness would be wholly unwarranted. Current science is collaborative and 
fundamentally reliant on epistemic respect and trust between those among whom 
scientific labour is divided. The culture of science also essentially involves questioning 
the calculations, methods or beliefs of one’s collaborators on occasion. Science is not a 
fixed set of beliefs but rather a dynamic network. It is sustained by checking and double-
checking, and the relentless search for greater accuracy and precision, both in 
measurements and models. Science is social knowing based on testimony, but it is also 
based on the actuality and possibility of third-party scrutiny. In many cases the scientific 
knowledge we have is the product of the collaborative efforts of many individuals over 
many years, each playing their part in accumulating data and correcting error22. 
 
In the previous section it was pointed out that adherents of scientism may also hold some 
form of the fact/value distinction and argue that science is silent about the moral norms 
we should adopt, and hence about all or part of ethics and politics. Hence, they may 
completely agree with Haack when she says, “results from the sciences can give us 
information about the relation of means to ends, but cannot by themselves tell us what 
ends are desirable.” (ibid., p. 45) However, we should be scientifically informed about 
the biological and social facts that bear on the practicality of ethical and political policy 
proposals. In this minimal sense, science is relevant to moral deliberation, but in some 
cases it may do more and transform how we think about the issues. To many critics of 
scientism, the idea that we are natural beings subject to the causal nexus of the physical 
world seems somehow to reduce our humanity. However, we owe it to those afflicted 
with organic problems such as the brain tissue degeneration that occurs with dementia to 
understand the biological processes involved as well as possible. Better scientific 
knowledge has been accompanied by demands for more compassionate treatment of 
dementia sufferers and their carers. Science cannot tell us what our ends should be, but it 
transforms our conception of ourselves, the world and what is possible for us. 
 
Science clearly cannot tell us what we should value, but given that we do value individual 
people extremely highly, it can help us enact our beneficence. Scientific medicine is 
obviously the most striking example of the miraculous humanitarian intervention that is 
made possible by science and technology; others include mitigation of famine and natural 
disasters. Liberals accept that there are competing conceptions of the good and that our 
political institutions should accommodate them, not favour any one of them in particular. 
Hence they may be construed as arguing that since we do not know what a good human 
life is, different beliefs about the matter are politically legitimate. The extent to which 
economics and political science incorporate norms and values varies, but when it comes 
to matters such as predictions about the effect of policy proposals there is nothing 
comparable to the precision and predictive success of the physical sciences, and in some 
cases there may be little that can be said that is objective. Analogously, scientism may be 
understood as making science authoritative in respect of knowledge while allowing that 
                                                 
21 This does not presuppose scientific realism since even empiricists like Bas van Fraassen accept that 
science tells us the (approximate) truth about the phenomena. 




different sources of beliefs about various matters, especially ethics, may legitimately play 
an important role. It is also consistent with scientism as characterised above that there are 
legitimate sources of belief and knowledge other than science. To say that an activity or 
group merits epistemic respect means, minimally, that it is a seat of rational inquiry, is 
methodologically reliable to some extent, and makes a contribution to knowledge. There 
are many such examples including legal inquiry, folk local and natural history, academic 
history, and so on. 
 
Humane scientism must take account of the hugely varied methods of the sciences and 
the rich role of experiment and practice, as well as theory and modelling. The previous 
section argues that scientism does not require either materialism or reductionism, 
although arguably it does depend on the integration and unity of science that supports a 
weak form of physicalism. Scientism does not require the denial of the first person 
perspective, nor need devalue the explorations of the latter in the arts and humanities. 
Scientism does not demand belief in the omniscience or omnicompetence of science and 
the replacement of all other forms of inquiry, including the traditional modes of study in 
the arts and humanities. However, it does deny that science has any particular limits in 
principle, in the sense that there are no domains to which scientific methods and theories 
cannot be applied. On what grounds could it be decided that some domain is out of reach 
of science? 
 
Haack is right that there are various rhetorical weaknesses with scientism as hitherto 
formulated. It is associated with an uncritical attitude to science, and the use of the word 
‘scientist’ and its cognates as epistemic honorifics is sometimes suggestive of a tribal 
mentality There is too much deference to scientists outside of their areas of expertise in 
the media, and a lack of appreciation of how specialized science now is, and how easy it 
is for a scientist to know nothing about even the basics of other disciplines (and even 
other parts of their own disciplines) especially when it comes to pronouncing on 
conceptual or philosophical issues. Heather Douglas (2009) and Philip Kitcher (2011) 
argue that we should defer to scientists’ judgments in their areas of expertise, but not on 
questions of public policy. Again, this seems uncontroversial, and required by scientism, 
as we should only ever defer to experts in their domains of expertise. Some scientists 
become experts in the relevant area of public policy, but many do not; and being good at, 
for example, designing nuclear warheads, obviously does not ipso facto make one good at 
deciding whether to build them and if or when to use them. 
 
Scientism must not be pseudoscientism. Humane scientism must be especially careful to 
insist that much of the use of quantification and metrics outside scientific research in, for 
example, corporate or government documents and procedures is pseudoscience, bearing 
none of the epistemic hallmarks of true science, because it involves only the superficial 
guise of measurement lacking features such as calibration, precision, and empirical 
reliability. This happens a great deal with so-called ‘evidence-based decision making’, 
which in fact consists in the manipulation of numbers which disguise massive value 
judgments; judgements that may have been made on the most dubious of grounds, about 
what categories should be used, how they should be aggregated, and how the scores 
assigned by different scorers should be combined. The fact that the methods in these 
 
 
domains are in constant flux is a sure sign that something is wrong. 
 
Among current sciences there are forms of highly theoretical reasoning, at one extreme, 
and forms of experiment and data gathering with little in the way of theory at the other. 
Mathematical manipulation may be used to provide the superficial appearance of science 
and statistics can be deployed in ways that even the cognoscenti may not (at first at least) 
realize are bogus. Trust in science must be differentiated and proportionate. Established 
science that has been the subject of ever more rigorous testing over decades or centuries, 
is obviously not on a par with the latest speculations about string theory or the multiverse. 
Many scientists are very good at what they do, but less good at describing it, and many 
say very confused things when they come to discuss the bigger picture or how science 
works. Accordingly, scientism does not involve blind faith, dogmatism or uncritical 
adherence to some imagined complete corpus of scientific knowledge. Indeed, science 
thrives on the relentless search for and reduction of error and imprecision within its own 
theories, models and data. 
 
In sum, humane scientism takes science to be authoritative in respect of objective 
knowledge, including about human beings and society. It recognizes no limits to science 
in principle, but is also antithetical to scientific hubris and hype. However, humane 
scientism holds the best of the arts and humanities in high esteem and recognises the role 
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